Justice Scalia on “Intent of the Legislature”
In reality, however, if one accepts the principle that the objective of judicial interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature, being bound by genuine but unexpressed legislative intent rather than the law is only the theoretical threat. The practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field. When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean. (Scalia, 1998)
Source:
Scalia, A. (1998). A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. (A. Gutmann, Ed.) Princeton University Press.
